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Argument 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the District Court erred when it denied 
Appellant's Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order. As stated in Appellant's 
Opening Brief, "[f]or a district court to set aside a default judgment pursuant to Rule 
60(b), 'a defendant must show: (i) that the judgment was entered against him through 
excusable neglect ( or any other reason specified in Rule 60(b) ), (ii) that his motion to set 
aside the judgment was timely, and (iii) that he has a meritorious defense to the action."' 
Bodell Construction v. Robbins, 2014 UT App. 203, 334 P.3d 1004, 1007 
(Ut.Ct.App.2014). There is no dispute that Appellant's motion was timely. The only 
elements in contention are whether ( 1) there was excusable neglect; and (2) Appellant 
had a meritorious defense to the action. 
"[T]here is no specific legal test for excusable neglect." Jones v. Layton/Ok/and, 
2009 UT 39, 214 P.3d 859, 863 (Ut.2009). "The equitable nature of the excusable 
neglect determination requires that a district court be free to consider all facts it deems 
relevant to its decision and weigh them accordingly." Id. The excusable part of 
excusable negligence imposes upon the moving party "some evidence of diligence in 
order to justify relief." Id. The diligence required under Rule 60 does not, however, rise 
to the level of "due diligence" or "perfect diligence." All that is required is that the 
moving party show some diligence. 
The question of diligence in this matter relates exclusively to Appellant and his 
attorney's failure to attend the April 18, 2016 hearing. It was at this hearing that the 
3 
default judgment in question was entered by the District Court. Appellant asserts that he 
was not given notice of this hearing until April 16, 2016 when Lloyd Rickenbach, ~ 
Appellant's attorney at the time, entered an appearance in the case. (Record on Appeal 
"ROA" at #000301). Appellant further asserts that Mr. Rickenbach took immediate 
action by filing a Motion to Continue on the same date he discovered the existence of the 
hearing. It is Appellant's contention that the actions taken by Mr. Rickenbach constitute 
requisite diligence under Rule 60. 
Appellee asserts that "Rickenbach was given actual notice of the April 18, 2016 
hearing." (Appellee's Response Brief, at p. 14). In support of this assertion, Appellee ~ 
relies solely on an after-the-fact and self-serving affidavit filed by Appellee's counsel's 
secretary, Jill Miles, stating that Ms. Miles mailed the Notice of Hearing to Mr. 
Rickenbach. The District Court accepted Appellee' s assertion regarding actual notice of 
the hearing. 
Specifically, the District Court made the following representations in its August ~ 
15, 2016 Memorandum Decision and Order: 
At I :30 P.M. on 18 April 2016, the Court convened probate 
case number 153600021 for oral argument on the Petition as 
scheduled. Only Olsen and Peterson appeared. Apparently 
presuming the Court would grant the motion to continue the 
hearing, neither Torgerson nor Rickenbach appeared. 
0 lsen expressed surprise when the Court informed him of 
Torgerson's Motion to Continue Hearing, and objected to any 
continuance. Olsen explained to the Court that due to 
application of§ 75-3-804(2), Torgerson no longer had a valid 
claim against the estate. Olsen also explained that 
Torgerson had indeed been afforded proper notice of the 
hearing when Miles mailed the Court's notice to 




(ROA, at #000315)( emphasis added). The District Court's statement regarding the issue 
of notice at the April 18, 2016 hearing is incorrect. 
The following exchange between the District Court and Appellee' s attorney 
occurred at the April 18, 2016 hearing: 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, it looks like one of the other 
things he points out in his motion is that apparently, the clerks 
gave notice only to you of the hearing, and didn't give notice 
to Mr. Torgerson, who had filed a claim and a demand for 
notice with the Court. So that mistake's happened too. I'm 
wondering-
MR. OLSEN: One additional problem with that, Your Honor, 
is in the estate, they've completely defaulted. No bonus was 
required. 
(ROA, at #000405-406). It is Appellant's belief that the word "bonus" found in Mr. 
Olsen's statement should be "notice" as the word "bonus" is completely inapplicable to 
the proceeding and "notice" and "bonus" have similar sounds for court reporting 
purposes. Basically, Appellant believes that Mr. Olsen stated that "[n]o notice was 
required." 
The significance of this exchange is that it contradicts the District Court's 
assertion that Mr. Olsen told the District Court at the April 18, 2016 hearing that his 
office had mailed a notice of the hearing to Mr. Rickenbach on March 30, 2016. There 
was no discussion between the District Court and Appellee's attorney regarding an 
alleged mailing of notice to Mr. Rickenbach. To the contrary, it appears to have been 
Appellee's attorney's position at the April 18, 2016 hearing that notice of the hearing was 
not required. 
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It would seem logical if Appellee's attorney had, in fact, mailed notice to Mr. 
Rickenbach on March 30, 2016, he would have said so at the April 18, 2016 hearing ~ 
when the issue arose. He did not. This fact, along with the lack of a contemporaneous 
filing of a certificate of service for the mailing, calls into question the veracity of Ms. 
Miles' after-the-fact assertion. 
It is undisputed that the District Court did not give statutory notice of the April 18, 
2016 hearing to either Appellant or Mr. Rickenbach. It is also undisputed that there was 
no contemporaneously filed certificate of service evidencing the alleged March 30, 2016 
mailing by Ms. Miles. It is further undisputed that Mr. Rickenbach filed a motion to 
continue the April 18, 2016 immediately upon entering his appearance in the case. Under 
these undisputed facts, Appellant acted with the requisite diligence for a Rule 60 motion. 
The second issue in contention is whether Appellant sufficiently demonstrated that 
he had a meritorious defense to the action. The District Court acknowledged that 
Appellant did present evidence of a "paper trail, including the leases and check" as 
evidence of his entitlement to the property in question, but held that said evidence 
ignored "the elephant in the room," the failure on the part of Appellant to timely 
prosecute his claim under § 75-3-804(2). (ROA, at #000324-325). 
There is no elephant in the room. Appellant's claim against the estate included the 
following assertions: (1) lease of real property between Appellant and the decedent; and 
(2) the right of first refusal to purchase the property in question. (ROA, at #000026). 
These claims, however unartfully made, are claims for specific performance. 
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"The term 'claim' found in [the Probate Code] does not include a claim for 
~ specific performance. . . . " In Re Estate of Sharp, 53 7 P .2d 1034, I 03 7 (Ut.197 5). 
Torgerson's claim cannot, therefore, be time barred by the Probate Code. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth herein and in Appellant's Opening Brief, Appellant 
requests that the Court reverse the District Court's decision denying Appellant's Rule 60 
motion, and remand the matter back to the District Court so that Appellant's claims can 
be resolved on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted by, 
~/U~ 
Michael P. Van Tassell 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
Certificate of Compliance With Rule 24(f)(l) 
I, Michael P. Van Tassell, certify that this document, Brief of Appellant, complies 
with the Court's type-volume limitations and contains 1480 words according to the word 
processing software used to prepare this document. 
~/7~~ 
Michael P. Van Tassell 
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